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Ken Wilber
March 2009 
On the Term "Idealism"
Posted on Jan 29th, 2009
by 
kelamuni
kelamuni
Recent scholarly work on Yogachara has called into question the degree to which the Yogachara can be called a form of Idealism. Such work begs the question as to what we mean by the term when we use it.
There are various meanings that the term "idealism" can take, and though they are related in various ways, they are not identical. To begin, we can eliminate one sense -- the non-philosophical use of the term, such as when we speak of "youthful idealism," or the enthusiastic interest in the advancement of some ideal.
Beyond this general sense of the term "idealism," there are several more or less technical or philosophical meanings for the term. These meanings, in turn, vary in degrees of technical specificity. This varying degree of specificity can at times present problems to non-specialists looking for precise philosophical definitions. For example, the philosophy of Plato is often called a form of "idealism." And yet at the same time, it is also called a form of Realism, and referred to as representative of the "realism" espoused by the ancient world. To clarify this seeming conflagration, the various meanings of these terms need to be disentangled. We can perhaps begin with the contrast between the ancient and the modern; we can then move through the problem historically, all the while related their Indian analogs.
When we refer to the ancient philosophy of Greece as a form of "realism" we mean something rather specfic. To get at this meaning we need to review some basic presuppositions of modern philosophy. Modern philosophy is characterized by a concern with the problem of epistemological foundations. This concern has lead to some rather particular developments in the areas of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and the theory of perception. It is generally acknowledged that such developments begin with Descartes and continue through the empiricists. We will return to this development below; for now, I will simply state the general character of modern epistemology and how it affects modern metaphysics. Basically, the moderns are concerned with what I can know and how I know it. Perhaps the most paradigmatic statement of this concern is the question: how can I have (certain) knowledge of the world; how do I know for sure that the world is not a fabrication, a dream, or illusion presented by some very powerful but malevolent entity? This basic problem will inform the development of much of modern metaphysics, the philosophy mind, and the theory of perception, and it lies at the basis of modern forms of philosophical idealism.
In contrast, for the ancients, no such "problem" existed. To be sure, there were skeptics in late antiquity, but in general there was no epistemic problem in the ancient world to the degree that we find among the moderns. In this sense, the ancients can be called "realists" insofar as, for them, there was never any doubt about whether or not we actually see a real world. For the ancients, we more or less see things as they are. In this sense, Platonism can be called a form of "realism."
There is another sense that Platonism can be called a form of Realism, and that concerns the status of universals -- ideas, numbers, etc. In Platonism, universals are considered to be real entities, existing in an ideal state of being. Particulars, then, as the instances of universals, are, in some sense, "less real" than universals. Today, Realism is considered one of the basic theories of foundational mathematics, alongside "logicism" and "intuitionism." In terms of metaphysics, Realism (distinguished through the use of a capital letter) is contrasted not with idealism but with nominalism. Nominalism is the theory that ideas, numbers, mathematical laws, and logical laws are all contingent. In nominalism, the metaphysical priority of the universal, found in Realism, is reversed. In other words, ideas do not actually exist in some ideal logical space as real entities. For the nominalists, they are but mere generalizations, drawn from empirical data through the process of abstraction.
But, at the same time, it is this emphasis on the "idea," and also the notion that particulars are "less real," that gives us the view that Platonism is also a form "idealism." At this point, then, we can refer to a specific sense of the term "idealism." Here, idealism refers to the generalized point of view that the world, the realm of the senses, or what Plato referred to as the realm of "becoming," is, in some sense, "less real" than an idealized realm, or world "beyond" the senses (and the mind in some sense). This idea, that the realm of "becoming" is but a mere "shadow play," (as per the Republic) qualifies Platonism as a form of idealism, at least in this in this sense of the term.
Many religious philosophies are also idealist in this sense. The Madhyamika, Yogachara, and Advaita Vedanta are also referred to as "idealist" in an analogous sense, insofar as they insist that reality is not as it appears at first glance to the "everyday mind;" and that there exists a reality transcending the "world," an ultimate reality, in which things exist as they are in themselves, a reality that is in some sense "more real" than the one we normally find ourselves apprehending. Most forms of mysticism -- which holds that this ideal reality not only exists, but can be apprehended through spiritual discipline and training -- can, in this sense, be said to imply this form of idealism.
Insofar as the idealistic schools of Indian thought deny the ultimate reality of the world in the above manner, they can be contrasted with their semantic correlates, the "realist" schools of Indian philosophy -- the Mimamsa, Nyaya-Vaishesika, the Jains, and "hinayana" schools of Buddhist thought: the Sarvastivada and the Sautrantika. Technically speaking, the Samkhya-Yoga is a realist school, though it contains tendencies that incline it toward "idealism" insofar as they too hold that there exists a kind a cognitive error that needs to be overcome through spiritual discipline, and place emphasis on the spiritual principle, the Purusha.
This last semantic development leads to an even more particular sense for the term "idealism." This last sense is the metaphysical idea that the "world" -- which included "matter" and the objects of the senses -- is but a creation of mind. Here, two forms of idealism can be loosely distiguished: subjective idealism and absolute idealism. An instance of subjective idealism would be the philosophy of Berkeley. An instance of absolute idealism would be the philosophy of Hegel. The difference between the two relates, for the most part, to questions relating to the epistemological problem of how it is that we see the world.
Subjective idealism can be seen as a development from the position of phenomenalism, in particular, the theory of perception put forward by the phenomenalists. A similar and parallel development occurs in the development of Abhidharma thought, from the (hinayana) Sautrantikas to the (Mahayana) Yogacharins. In this latter case, the issue does not relate, to as great a degree, to the problem of epistemological foundationalism. But it does relate to a theory of perception that parallels developments in the West.
In the phenomenalism of both the Empiricists of Europe and the Sautrantika Buddhists in India, we find what is often referred to as the "representational" theory of perception (this theory is also found in the Samkhya-Yoga school and in the Vedanta generally). According to the representational theory of perception, we do not actually directly see objects; rather, we see a representation of the object in our mind, like an imprint of a solid object on a disc of soft wax, as it were. Phenomenalists, such as empiricists and the Sautrantikas, are "realists" in the sense that, 1. what we see when we see these representations are indeed accurate likenesses of objects, and 2. the objects that give rise to representations are indeed real objects existing "outside" in the mind. But there is also sense in which the representationalism of the phenomenalists can be called a kind of "quasi-idealism" insofar as, according to this theory, we do not actually apprehend physical objects when we perceive as much as we apprehend representations occuring in some sort of mental space.
In any case, the representationalism of the phenomenalists contains within it a tendency toward what we have referred to as subjective or epistemological idealism. In subjective idealism, the "outside" object is dropped altogether as unnecessary and redundant; all that exists are mental events. In the case of the West, this development is due to pressure contained in the "logic" of epistemological foundationalism. In a sense, as Wittgenstein noted, Berkeley was the most consistent of the British empiricists in that he submitted himself to the force of this "logic." For his own part, Hume simply could not accept this outcome in toto, even though the conclusion of subjective idealism was logically compelling to him. At the end of the day, as he admits, he goes home and plays billards and does not question the existence of the balls on the table. The development of epistemological idealism in the Yogachara is more difficult to trace. Here, the pressure appears to have come from two directions: one logical and the other soteriological. In the case of the former, it appears to have involved the resolution of certain difficulties left over from the Abhidharma analysis of mental events.
Another form of idealism -- situated "between" subjective idealism and absolute idealism, and yet different from both -- also indirectly develops out of phenomenalism: transcendental idealism. Transcendental idealism also holds that we do not directly perceive objects as they are in themselves; rather, we only perceive the phenomenal appearance of the object. This phenomenal appearance consists of raw perceptual data as well as certain conceptually constructed elements fused with sense data. Transcendental idealists hold that our cognitive make-up is such that conceptual construction forms an integral part of all mental events, including perception. It represents a kind of compromise with "realism" -- in that it holds that the perception of the world is an objective event that has objective validity -- but, technically and strictly speaking, unlike phenomenalism, it is not a form of realism but a form of idealism. Examples of transcendental idealism include the philosophy of Kant, and posibly the philosophy of the great Buddhist logicians, Dignaga and Dharmakirti. Like Kant, Dignaga and Dharmakirti hold that all perception involves a degree of conceptual construction (vikalpa; kalpana). But like Kant, they also hold that the "thing in itself," or what they call the pure particular (svalakshana), is the basis of all perception, even though it is never directly perceived. The school of thought initiated by Dignaga and Dharmakirti eventually became the dominant school of Buddhist philosophy in India. It reflects a synthesis of Yogachara and Sautrantika thought with logicism.
Let us now return to the Yogachara idealism. It is generally thought by scholars that there are two forms of Yogachara thought. (See http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/ew27052.htm) This distinction leads us to the final form of idealism we shall look at here: absolute idealism. Absolute idealism, as a generalized point of view, holds, 1. that "spirit" (consciousness, mind, etc.) is in some sense more real than "matter"; and 2. that the material world is in some sense an "emanation" from pure spirit. Though we find this idea in the modern West in the philosophy of Hegel, and in the midst of the development of Buddhist philosophy and logic, this perspective actually harkens back to very ancient ideas of cosmogony, in particular to the theistic cosmogonies of ancient Greece and India that viewed God as, not only the instrumental, but the immanent material cause of the world (the "stuff" out of which the world is created.)
In the case of the second stream of the Yogachara, the world is seen as the "projection" (pratibhasa) of mind (vijnana; citta). We find a similar idea in pre-Shankara Advaita Vedanta as well, for example, in the Gaudapada Karikas, which describes the world as due to the "vibration" (sphurana) of mind or consciousness (manas; vijnana; citta). We also find this teaching in Kashmiri Shaivism, which consciously attempts to re-instate emanationist ideas of the older Shaivas.
These are the various senses of the term "idealism" that come to me off the top of my head, but an even fuller development of the semantic range of this term may also be possible. My characterizations of the various philosophies presented here are, of course, open to being challenged. I have, over the course of this post, presented the "received" views of these schools found among prominent scholars. My point here is not to defend these views; it is merely to clarify the various senses of the term "idealism" through the use of examples.
There are various meanings that the term "idealism" can take, and though they are related in various ways, they are not identical. To begin, we can eliminate one sense -- the non-philosophical use of the term, such as when we speak of "youthful idealism," or the enthusiastic interest in the advancement of some ideal.
Beyond this general sense of the term "idealism," there are several more or less technical or philosophical meanings for the term. These meanings, in turn, vary in degrees of technical specificity. This varying degree of specificity can at times present problems to non-specialists looking for precise philosophical definitions. For example, the philosophy of Plato is often called a form of "idealism." And yet at the same time, it is also called a form of Realism, and referred to as representative of the "realism" espoused by the ancient world. To clarify this seeming conflagration, the various meanings of these terms need to be disentangled. We can perhaps begin with the contrast between the ancient and the modern; we can then move through the problem historically, all the while related their Indian analogs.
When we refer to the ancient philosophy of Greece as a form of "realism" we mean something rather specfic. To get at this meaning we need to review some basic presuppositions of modern philosophy. Modern philosophy is characterized by a concern with the problem of epistemological foundations. This concern has lead to some rather particular developments in the areas of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and the theory of perception. It is generally acknowledged that such developments begin with Descartes and continue through the empiricists. We will return to this development below; for now, I will simply state the general character of modern epistemology and how it affects modern metaphysics. Basically, the moderns are concerned with what I can know and how I know it. Perhaps the most paradigmatic statement of this concern is the question: how can I have (certain) knowledge of the world; how do I know for sure that the world is not a fabrication, a dream, or illusion presented by some very powerful but malevolent entity? This basic problem will inform the development of much of modern metaphysics, the philosophy mind, and the theory of perception, and it lies at the basis of modern forms of philosophical idealism.
In contrast, for the ancients, no such "problem" existed. To be sure, there were skeptics in late antiquity, but in general there was no epistemic problem in the ancient world to the degree that we find among the moderns. In this sense, the ancients can be called "realists" insofar as, for them, there was never any doubt about whether or not we actually see a real world. For the ancients, we more or less see things as they are. In this sense, Platonism can be called a form of "realism."
There is another sense that Platonism can be called a form of Realism, and that concerns the status of universals -- ideas, numbers, etc. In Platonism, universals are considered to be real entities, existing in an ideal state of being. Particulars, then, as the instances of universals, are, in some sense, "less real" than universals. Today, Realism is considered one of the basic theories of foundational mathematics, alongside "logicism" and "intuitionism." In terms of metaphysics, Realism (distinguished through the use of a capital letter) is contrasted not with idealism but with nominalism. Nominalism is the theory that ideas, numbers, mathematical laws, and logical laws are all contingent. In nominalism, the metaphysical priority of the universal, found in Realism, is reversed. In other words, ideas do not actually exist in some ideal logical space as real entities. For the nominalists, they are but mere generalizations, drawn from empirical data through the process of abstraction.
But, at the same time, it is this emphasis on the "idea," and also the notion that particulars are "less real," that gives us the view that Platonism is also a form "idealism." At this point, then, we can refer to a specific sense of the term "idealism." Here, idealism refers to the generalized point of view that the world, the realm of the senses, or what Plato referred to as the realm of "becoming," is, in some sense, "less real" than an idealized realm, or world "beyond" the senses (and the mind in some sense). This idea, that the realm of "becoming" is but a mere "shadow play," (as per the Republic) qualifies Platonism as a form of idealism, at least in this in this sense of the term.
Many religious philosophies are also idealist in this sense. The Madhyamika, Yogachara, and Advaita Vedanta are also referred to as "idealist" in an analogous sense, insofar as they insist that reality is not as it appears at first glance to the "everyday mind;" and that there exists a reality transcending the "world," an ultimate reality, in which things exist as they are in themselves, a reality that is in some sense "more real" than the one we normally find ourselves apprehending. Most forms of mysticism -- which holds that this ideal reality not only exists, but can be apprehended through spiritual discipline and training -- can, in this sense, be said to imply this form of idealism.
Insofar as the idealistic schools of Indian thought deny the ultimate reality of the world in the above manner, they can be contrasted with their semantic correlates, the "realist" schools of Indian philosophy -- the Mimamsa, Nyaya-Vaishesika, the Jains, and "hinayana" schools of Buddhist thought: the Sarvastivada and the Sautrantika. Technically speaking, the Samkhya-Yoga is a realist school, though it contains tendencies that incline it toward "idealism" insofar as they too hold that there exists a kind a cognitive error that needs to be overcome through spiritual discipline, and place emphasis on the spiritual principle, the Purusha.
This last semantic development leads to an even more particular sense for the term "idealism." This last sense is the metaphysical idea that the "world" -- which included "matter" and the objects of the senses -- is but a creation of mind. Here, two forms of idealism can be loosely distiguished: subjective idealism and absolute idealism. An instance of subjective idealism would be the philosophy of Berkeley. An instance of absolute idealism would be the philosophy of Hegel. The difference between the two relates, for the most part, to questions relating to the epistemological problem of how it is that we see the world.
Subjective idealism can be seen as a development from the position of phenomenalism, in particular, the theory of perception put forward by the phenomenalists. A similar and parallel development occurs in the development of Abhidharma thought, from the (hinayana) Sautrantikas to the (Mahayana) Yogacharins. In this latter case, the issue does not relate, to as great a degree, to the problem of epistemological foundationalism. But it does relate to a theory of perception that parallels developments in the West.
In the phenomenalism of both the Empiricists of Europe and the Sautrantika Buddhists in India, we find what is often referred to as the "representational" theory of perception (this theory is also found in the Samkhya-Yoga school and in the Vedanta generally). According to the representational theory of perception, we do not actually directly see objects; rather, we see a representation of the object in our mind, like an imprint of a solid object on a disc of soft wax, as it were. Phenomenalists, such as empiricists and the Sautrantikas, are "realists" in the sense that, 1. what we see when we see these representations are indeed accurate likenesses of objects, and 2. the objects that give rise to representations are indeed real objects existing "outside" in the mind. But there is also sense in which the representationalism of the phenomenalists can be called a kind of "quasi-idealism" insofar as, according to this theory, we do not actually apprehend physical objects when we perceive as much as we apprehend representations occuring in some sort of mental space.
In any case, the representationalism of the phenomenalists contains within it a tendency toward what we have referred to as subjective or epistemological idealism. In subjective idealism, the "outside" object is dropped altogether as unnecessary and redundant; all that exists are mental events. In the case of the West, this development is due to pressure contained in the "logic" of epistemological foundationalism. In a sense, as Wittgenstein noted, Berkeley was the most consistent of the British empiricists in that he submitted himself to the force of this "logic." For his own part, Hume simply could not accept this outcome in toto, even though the conclusion of subjective idealism was logically compelling to him. At the end of the day, as he admits, he goes home and plays billards and does not question the existence of the balls on the table. The development of epistemological idealism in the Yogachara is more difficult to trace. Here, the pressure appears to have come from two directions: one logical and the other soteriological. In the case of the former, it appears to have involved the resolution of certain difficulties left over from the Abhidharma analysis of mental events.
Another form of idealism -- situated "between" subjective idealism and absolute idealism, and yet different from both -- also indirectly develops out of phenomenalism: transcendental idealism. Transcendental idealism also holds that we do not directly perceive objects as they are in themselves; rather, we only perceive the phenomenal appearance of the object. This phenomenal appearance consists of raw perceptual data as well as certain conceptually constructed elements fused with sense data. Transcendental idealists hold that our cognitive make-up is such that conceptual construction forms an integral part of all mental events, including perception. It represents a kind of compromise with "realism" -- in that it holds that the perception of the world is an objective event that has objective validity -- but, technically and strictly speaking, unlike phenomenalism, it is not a form of realism but a form of idealism. Examples of transcendental idealism include the philosophy of Kant, and posibly the philosophy of the great Buddhist logicians, Dignaga and Dharmakirti. Like Kant, Dignaga and Dharmakirti hold that all perception involves a degree of conceptual construction (vikalpa; kalpana). But like Kant, they also hold that the "thing in itself," or what they call the pure particular (svalakshana), is the basis of all perception, even though it is never directly perceived. The school of thought initiated by Dignaga and Dharmakirti eventually became the dominant school of Buddhist philosophy in India. It reflects a synthesis of Yogachara and Sautrantika thought with logicism.
Let us now return to the Yogachara idealism. It is generally thought by scholars that there are two forms of Yogachara thought. (See http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/ew27052.htm) This distinction leads us to the final form of idealism we shall look at here: absolute idealism. Absolute idealism, as a generalized point of view, holds, 1. that "spirit" (consciousness, mind, etc.) is in some sense more real than "matter"; and 2. that the material world is in some sense an "emanation" from pure spirit. Though we find this idea in the modern West in the philosophy of Hegel, and in the midst of the development of Buddhist philosophy and logic, this perspective actually harkens back to very ancient ideas of cosmogony, in particular to the theistic cosmogonies of ancient Greece and India that viewed God as, not only the instrumental, but the immanent material cause of the world (the "stuff" out of which the world is created.)
In the case of the second stream of the Yogachara, the world is seen as the "projection" (pratibhasa) of mind (vijnana; citta). We find a similar idea in pre-Shankara Advaita Vedanta as well, for example, in the Gaudapada Karikas, which describes the world as due to the "vibration" (sphurana) of mind or consciousness (manas; vijnana; citta). We also find this teaching in Kashmiri Shaivism, which consciously attempts to re-instate emanationist ideas of the older Shaivas.
These are the various senses of the term "idealism" that come to me off the top of my head, but an even fuller development of the semantic range of this term may also be possible. My characterizations of the various philosophies presented here are, of course, open to being challenged. I have, over the course of this post, presented the "received" views of these schools found among prominent scholars. My point here is not to defend these views; it is merely to clarify the various senses of the term "idealism" through the use of examples.
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