The Question of the Status of the World in Advaita Vedanta

The question of the status of the world is one of the basic questions on the menu of Indian philosophical topics. It is a question that is particularly associated with the so-called "illusionistic" or "idealist" schools (Madhyamika, Yogachara, Advaita Vedanta) but it is also important for those "realist" schools that oppose them. The terms "maya-vada," "vijnana-vada," and "shunya-vada" all reflect the priority of the question of the nature of the world for these schools, since each term is an expression of their respective answers to the question (illusory; of the nature of consciousness; empty).

With respect to classical Advaita Vedanta, the question of the status of the world is inseparable from three other questions: 1. the nature of creation; 2. the nature of ultimate reality; 3. the nature perceptual error.

In general, the Vedanta holds that the world is non-different (ananya) from brahman, insofar as it is an emanation or "transformation" (parinama) of brahman. The Vedanta holds the doctrine of sat-karya-vada, or the teaching that the effect has the same nature as the cause. Vedanta holds that brahman, whose nature is essentially intelligent, is both the material and instrumental cause of the world. The Samkhya holds that brahman, whose nature is sentient, cannot be the material cause of the world, since the world is basically insentient, and the effect of material cause must share its nature with its cause. The Samkhya also holds to the doctrine of satkarya-vada, but it maintains that the insentient prakriti is the material cause of the world. These two forms of parinama-vada, or emanationism, are called brahma-parinama-vada and pradhana-parinama-vada. Both can be taken as forms of small 'r' "realism"; in other words, for them, the world really is an emanation from a material cause.

Mainstream Vedanta, prior to the ascendency of the Advaita school, also held that the world was, at the same time, distinct from brahman. The example they give to illustrate this idea is that of a pot and the lump of clay from which it is made. Such material examples, like gold and bracelet or milk and curd, abound in the early Vedanta, and can be traced back to the Chandogya Upanishad.

The Brahma Sutra deals with the question of emanation of the world from brahman at 2.1.14 There it says that the world is non-separate (ananya) from brahman. The question is: "what does "ananya" mean? Shankara glosses the sutra thus: it means that the world does not exist (abhava) apart from (vyatirekena) brahman. But what does this mean? Does it mean that, considered in itself and apart from brahman, the world has no reality? Or does it mean that there is no real world as such and that there is only brahman?. The first answer refers to the view of Vedanta in general, and is consonant with a form of "realism," while the second is decidedly illusionistic. Shankara's gloss here is purposefully equivocal: it is both. This is because he is attempting to mediate the traditional orthodox view with his non-dual interpretation of Vedanta. In Advaita Vedanta these two interpretations hierarchically. The first refers to the general view of Vedanta view and can be seen as propaedeutic. The second refers to the ultimate view of the Advaita, namely, ajata-vada.

In the classical Vedanta, the view that the world is essentially unreal or a merely an "illusion" is one that is most strongly associated with the Gaudapada Karikas. It would be pointless and redundant to tabulate all the points in the GK that this kind of description of the world occurs. Two verses, however, are particularly relevant, GK 2.3-2.4. G.K 2.3 says that since dream objects are non-existent (abhava), dreams are considered unreal (vaitathyam). 2.4 says that the waking state should be considered in the same manner. But what does this mean? The two verses have been subject to debate among scholars. V. Bhattacharya says that it means that the two are non-different. But the standard interpretation has it that that the two are different in at least one way: insofar as the dream takes place in a "space" other than that of the waking state. For his own part, Shankara clearly distinguishes dreaming from the waking state. For him, it makes no sense to say that the two are literally the same. Here, we can see a growing recognition that the archaic illusionistic argument that waking reality is the "same" as a dream comes to be seen as simplistic.

Rather, for Shankara and "Gaudapada," dreaming and waking are to be seen as having a similar status. And what is that status? This is revealed at GK 2.6-7. There, the GK says that what comes and goes cannot have an absolute reality (sat). This idea is reiterated and developed in Shankara's comments at Gita 2.16: what varies, he says, is not ultimately real. The term used for "varies" here is "vyabhichara." This term is also used to refer to a specific logical fallacy. Literally, the term means to "stray" or "wander." If I say, for example, 'where there is fire there is oxygen,' the first term does not "stray" and the statement holds. If I say, 'where there is oxygen there is fire,' the first term "strays" insofar as we can give an example in which it does not hold, the room we are sitting in, for example. Here, then, we have a definition of reality that makes use of a specific logical terminology: reality is that which never strays; it is, in other words, that which is always present. States of consciousness, mental states, the body itself, all come and go. But "consciousness" itself, which underpins the rest, does not come and go; it abides in all states. Thus, the waking state has the "same status" as the dream state, insofar as it comes and goes. In this sense, it is not ultimately real.

It should be noted that the qualifier, "ultimately," has entered into our manner of expression. To understand why this is so we need to go back to Nagarjuna, and ultimately the Upanishads. As we noted, GK 2.6-7 says that what comes and goes is not ultimately real. At GK 3.2 and 4.7 this idea is expanded. The real, these verses say, is that which does not change its nature, or to put it literally, it is that nature (prakrti) which is not otherwise (an-anyatha). This definition is taken from Nagarjuna's Madhyamika karika 15.8. There, Nagarjuna defines the nature of svabhava or "own-being" in exactly the same manner as given in the GK. At 15.1-2 he adds that the svabhava is also that which does not rely on another, that is, that which is completely indenpendent and unrelated to any other thing; in other words, it is absolute. Svabhava also means that which is natural or innate (akrtrima), the synonym for which is "sahaja," a term used by the GK at 4.9, the idea being that it is uncaused or ajata.

Actually, Nagarjuna adapst this definition, and manner of thinking, from the Upanishads; he uses it, however, against itself so as to subvert all forms of metaphysical absolutism. For him "being" means absolute being (sat), being that does not come and go. We find this same idea at Chandogya 6.2.2. There, being, or sat, is that which does not come into being or go out of being. 'What kind of reasoning,' it asks, 'is it that says that being comes from nothing, that says that a thing can pop into existence from nowhere. True being cannot come into existence.' It is this very idea that underlies the sat-karya-vada referred to above, the idea that the effect somehow or other "pre-exists" in its cause.

With respect to the dream argument referred to above, two points should be noticed. First, in it, we find a general principle of Indian thought: that where ever possible, Indian thinking attempts to concretize itself through the use of examples and illustrations. Thus, that we find the standard examples of Advaita Vedanta, that of the snake and the rope, and of silver and mother of pearl. In the silver and nacre example, someone walking on a beach thinks he sees some silver in the sand; but when he approaches it, it turns out only to be the inner side of piece of sea-shell. This example is intended to provide an illustration for how it is that brahma-jnana is able to contradict and controvert wordly, relative knowledge.

But we also find something else going on. It is clear that, at this point, the Advaitins are becoming aware of the fact that their "examples" cannot be taken literally. No, they are more like analogs. Thus, worldly knowledge is like a dream, and realization is akin to waking up.

We can then, perhaps, following Murti, distinguish between what can be called "empirical illusion," and what might be called, for lack of a better term, "transcendental illusion." By "transcendental" we do not mean "transcendent." What we mean, following Kant, is the idea that that built into our cognitive apparatus is something that we are not, and cannot be, aware of, namely, that we "construct" phenomenal appearance. Among the "idealist" schools, the Madhyamika, Yogachara and Advaita Vedanta, the terms used for this "conceptual construction" invlove the "klp" root: "vikalpa", "kalpana, "kalpita," and so on.

For the most part, Shankara tows the party line of the Vedanta: the world has brahman as its cause. But he also says that the world arises out of what he calls "unmanifest name and form." Structurally, this parallels the Samkhya's idea of prakriti forming the basis of the world. But Shankara wants to have it both ways here. He wants to support the brahmanic orthodoxy, but he also wants to make use of several ideas that have their basis in the unorthodox schools, the Samkhya and the Mahayana schools in particular. After Shankara, the later Advaitins will assert that maya or avidya is the cause of the world, or that brahman in conjuntion with avidya is the cause of the world. Shankara does not speak this way. For him avidya is an "epistemic" principle only; we might say that it is only "metaphysical" to the degree that it is involved in our conceptual construction of the world, that is, to the degree that it is the root of the transcendental illusion.

As we noted, Shankara is able to have it both ways by ranking "realism" and "illusionism." Now there are some interpreters who have argued that Shankara is actually more of a "realist." As I noted before, I think that we are justified in saying so as long as by "realism" we mean something like the realism of the ancients. Those who argue that Shankara is more of a realist in the general sense do so on the following three grounds: 1. on the basis of the interpretation of "ananyatva" that takes it as saying, "the world is real insofar as it exists in brahman"; 2. on the basis that the world does not "dissolve" with realization; 3. and on the basis that the world "becomes" brahman with realization.

Now, the first two of these arguments can be challenged. The first can be shown to be a propaedeutic view. And the second does not necessarily imply anything, other than the fact that the Advaitins were not pralaya-vadins (who thought the world and the mind "dissolve" with realization). The third point, though, is interesting. It refers to a single tract in Shankara's works, the comments on Brhad Upanishad 2.4.12. There the Upanishad refers to dissolution of the world into the "Mahabhuta" or great reality. Shankara comments that when discrimination arises "the world becomes one without a second" and "merges" with the Mahabhuta. He concretizes this idea saying that this means that one's separate existence dissappears and one returns to the "womb" or own-source (yoni). (In a similar way, at the end of chapter 3 of the Gaudapada Karikas, we read that all dharmas are "always already" non-dual and inherently quiescent.) But the language of "merging" used in the above is metaphoric for Shankara, so I don't think this final point stands scrutiny either.

At the same time, it is necessary to point out that there is indeed a pronounced "realist" streak in Shankara's writings (at least in those writings that were written after the commentary on the GK). Time and again he rejects the "idealist" arguments of the Yogacharins, and he continually refers to brahman as a "vastu" or real thing. More importantly, following an unnamed master referred to at the beginning of the Brahma Sutra commentary, he emphasizes that for the practitioner, the world is real until realization occurs.

But it would be wrong to simply stop here, for Shankara also, time and again, affirms the falseness, insubstantiality, and worthlessness of the world. For example:
Brhad Up 1.1.1 samsaric existence is "anartha," worthless
Brhad Up 2.4.14 the world is an-atma
Brhad up 5.1.1 the world is an-rta
Brahma Sutra 1.2.12 the world of practical reality is a-bhava, non-existent
Br Su 2.1.9 the world is like an a-vastu, unreal thing.

Brhad Up 3.5.1 contains the passage that says that the world is arta, "afflicted" or "oppressed." Shankara comments that this means that it is "seized" by sickness and destruction and that it is insubstantial (asara) like a magical illusion, dream, or mirage. Samsaric existence, he says, is an error (bhranti). The interlocutor asks, if the world arises from name and form, does not name and form constitute a separate reality, and hence, a duality with brahman? No, says, Shankara. From the ultimate point of view (paramartha drshti) name and form do not really (tattvata) exist apart from the real (vastu-antarena). Prior to discriminative knowledge, they exist (asti) in a conventional sense (vyavahara) as separate entities apart from the real. But the practical realm is false (mithya) and like the unreal (asat).

Also important are the comments at Br Su 2.1.14, the sutra dealing with creation and an-anyata. There Shankara says that though world is to be regarded as real until realization, it is really an-rta, and its "creation" is in "word only."

The definitive statement, however, comes at Br Su 2.1.27, which is the closing passage of this section. The sutras preceeding this sutra outline a series of contradictions in the traditional Vedanta view, most importantly: 1. that the world is insentient while brahman sentient, and hence, the cause will be different from the effect; and 2. that emanation implies the "dismemberment" of brahman; in other words, that the absolute will lose its unity and "non-duality."

The interlocutor begins by saying, "not even the most sophisticated reading of the Vedanta teachings can resolve all these contradictions. So who is going to follow such an incongruent teaching!" Shankara, slippery as ever, responds by saying, "There is no problem here. Difference," he says, "is a conceptual construct due to ignorance. Thus there is no more loss of unity in brahman anymore than there are multiple moons because some cross-eyed fool tells you so. The changing (parinama) world -- which is defined as name and form, consisting of the manifest and unmanifest, and conceptually constructed (kalpita) due to ignorance (avidya), and which is not describable as either a real or unreal -- has brahman as its basis (aspanda). In truth, however, brahman ultimately transcends all contingency (vyavahara-atita) and remains in itself unchanging (a-parinama). All these different names and forms exist in name only. Those passages talking about emanantion are not to be taken literally; those passages talking about creation are to be taken as teaching that brahman and the self are empty (rahita) of all contingency and relativity (vyavahara)."

The point that the world is "neither real (tattva) not unreal (atattva)" or "neither (wholly) existent (sat) nor (wholly) non-existent (asat)" is taken up by later Advaita philosophers. Clearly, they argue, it is not correct to say that the world is completely non-existent, like the son of a barren woman or hare with horns. In the later debates centring around the issue of the nature of preceptual error, the great Advaita philosophers like Vimuktatman, Chitsukha, and Anandabodha (none of whom have been translated into English) develop, with great dialectical skill, the idea that the world is "indescribable" (anirvachaniya) as neither a "sat" nor an "asat," as neither wholly unreal nor wholly real. This dialectical phase, wherein the other schools are treated and refuted, will form much of the basis for the later idea, found among the Advaita doxographers, that Advaita Vedanta "transcends and includes" the other schools.

Around this time, three levels of "reality" come to be distinguished among the Advaita philosophers: 1. the ultimately real, ie., brahman in itself or the supreme self; 2. practical reality, the everyday world; 3; and truly false things like square circles, hares with horns, fairy castles in the sky, dreams, illusions, etc. These latter unrealities are called "pratibhasika," and they are distinguished from what we have referred to above as the "transcendental illusion" of everyday existence.

The Advaita philosophers will continue to argue that the world has "maya" as its nature. But at an even later date, more radicallly illusionistic thinkers appear, such as Prakashatman who argue for a kind of idealism known technically as "drshti-srsht-vada." For this reason, some Vedantins refer to an "early" mayavada (i.e., Gaudapada and other early Advaitins) and a "late" mayavada (Prakashatman and a few others others). This distinction implies that even the Advaitins themselves noticed that Shankara's non-dualism, standing between the two extreme forms of maya-vada, had a pronoucned "realistic" streak to it.